

Appendices for “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility”

Alexander B. Downes
George Washington University
downes@gwu.edu

Todd S. Sechser
University of Virginia
tsechser@virginia.edu

Updated August 20, 2012

Table of Contents

This document contains several appendices associated with the article “[The Illusion of Democratic Credibility](#)” (*International Organization* 66:3: 457–89).

Appendix A: <i>Classification of Cases in the MID Narratives and ICB Archives</i>	1
Appendix B: <i>Replication of Schultz 2001</i>	29
Appendix C: <i>Procedures and Results Using the MCT Dataset</i>	35
References	46

Appendix A

Classification of Cases in the MID Narratives and ICB Archive

In “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (2012, 460–64), we evaluated the 294 disputes in the MID Narratives document (Correlates of War 2 Project 2004) and the 1,000 crisis dyads in the ICB dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997) to determine which cases contained coercive threats. We found that the vast majority of cases in these datasets did not involve coercive threats, and are therefore inappropriate for testing theories about the effectiveness of threats. Instead, most cases in these datasets fall into five categories: (1) minor skirmishes and border violations, (2) noncoercive alerts and exercises, (3) maritime incidents, (4) wars and wartime campaigns, and (5) nonmilitarized episodes.¹ The two categories of coercive threats – namely, (6) deterrent warnings, and (7) compellent threats – are quite rare, comprising only a small portion of each dataset. In the original article, we presented a table classifying the cases in these datasets into these seven categories (Downes and Sechser 2012, 462). This appendix indicates how we classified each of the cases in these datasets.

MID Narratives

We begin with the militarized interstate disputes described in the MID Narratives document. As we noted in our article, the MID dataset provides no narrative information about most of its cases, so we do not know which historical events are associated with most of these cases. Their appropriateness as a testing ground for theories about coercive threats therefore is difficult to judge without considerable additional research. However, thanks to the efforts of the Correlates of War 2 Project, we now have access to narrative synopses for 294 disputes – that is, most MIDs between 1992 and 2001. Although these summaries are not necessarily intended to be comprehensive, they do tell us a little bit about the events associated with these MIDs. Using these narratives as a starting point, we classified each of the 294 MIDs into the seven categories listed above. Our classifications are listed in Table 1.²

¹We describe these categories in more detail in the article (Downes and Sechser 2012, 460–64).

²Note that the “Side A” and “Side B” classifications are taken directly from the MID dataset and do not necessarily indicate which state (if any) issued a deterrent or compellent threat. For example, some states listed in the Side B column issued compellent threats.

<i>Dispute No.</i>	<i>Side A</i>	<i>Side B</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
3551	United States + 13 others	Yugoslavia	Compellent threat
3555	Croatia	Yugoslavia	Minor skirmish/border violation
3556	Croatia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	War/wartime campaign
3557	Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	War/wartime campaign
4001	Thailand	Cambodia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4002	Thailand	Myanmar	Minor skirmish/border violation
4003	Myanmar	Thailand	Minor skirmish/border violation
4004	Vietnam	Cambodia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4005	Bangladesh	India	Minor skirmish/border violation
4006	India	Bangladesh	Alert/exercise
4007	Pakistan	India	Minor skirmish/border violation
4008	Vietnam	Thailand	Maritime incident
4009	Venezuela	Colombia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4010	Honduras	El Salvador	Minor skirmish/border violation
4011	Nicaragua	Honduras	Maritime incident
4012	Honduras	Nicaragua	Deterrent warning
4013	Ecuador	Peru	War/wartime campaign
4014	Belize	Guatemala	Minor skirmish/border violation
4015	Belize	Guatemala	Minor skirmish/border violation
4016	United States + 6 others	Haiti	Compellent threat
4017	Italy	Slovenia	Alert/exercise
4018	North Korea	China	Minor skirmish/border violation
4019	North Korea	China	Maritime incident
4020	Taiwan	China	Maritime incident
4021	United States, South Korea	North Korea	Alert/exercise
4022	North Korea	United States + 4 others	Alert/exercise
4023	China	Taiwan	Deterrent warning
4024	Taiwan	Philippines	Alert/exercise
4025	Taiwan	Japan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4026	Japan	Taiwan	Maritime incident
4027	China	Philippines	Maritime incident
4028	Philippines	China	Maritime incident
4029	China	Vietnam	Nonmilitarized episode
4030	China	Vietnam	Maritime incident
4031	Canada	Spain	Maritime incident
4032	Dem. Rep. Congo	Belgium	Deterrent warning
4035	China	Taiwan	Deterrent warning
4038	Turkey	Cyprus	Minor skirmish/border violation
4039	Cyprus	Turkey	Minor skirmish/border violation
4040	Turkey	Greece	Deterrent warning
4041	Greece	Albania	Minor skirmish/border violation
4042	Russia	Japan	Maritime incident
4043	Albania	Yugoslavia	Nonmilitarized episode
4045	Yugoslavia	Albania	Alert/exercise
4046	Yugoslavia	United States, Macedonia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4048	France	Croatia	Alert/exercise
4050	Russia	Ukraine	Minor skirmish/border violation
4051	Russia	Moldova	Alert/exercise
4052	China	Russia	Maritime incident
4054	Russia + 5 others	Afghanistan	Deterrent warning
4055	Russia	Afghanistan	Minor skirmish/border violation

Table 1. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Dispute No.</i>	<i>Side A</i>	<i>Side B</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
4058	Albania	Macedonia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4060	Taiwan	Vietnam	Minor skirmish/border violation
4061	China	Japan	Alert/exercise
4062	China	Japan	Alert/exercise
4063	Indonesia	China	Deterrent warning
4064	China	United States, Taiwan	Deterrent warning
4065	China	United States, South Korea	Alert/exercise
4066	Ghana	Togo	Alert/exercise
4067	Chad	Niger	Minor skirmish/border violation
4068	Nigeria	Chad	Minor skirmish/border violation
4069	Dem. Rep. Congo	Congo	Minor skirmish/border violation
4071	Dem. Rep. Congo	Angola	Alert/exercise
4072	Iran	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4073	Egypt	Iran	Deterrent warning
4075	Papua New Guinea	Solomon Islands	Minor skirmish/border violation
4076	Papua New Guinea	Solomon Islands	Minor skirmish/border violation
4078	Uganda	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4079	Ethiopia	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4081	Sudan	Eritrea	Nonmilitarized episode
4082	Eritrea	Djibouti	Minor skirmish/border violation
4083	Kenya	Uganda	Minor skirmish/border violation
4084	Kenya	Uganda	Minor skirmish/border violation
4085	Nigeria	Ivory Coast	Minor skirmish/border violation
4086	Kazakhstan	Bulgaria	Minor skirmish/border violation
4087	North Korea	United States, South Korea, Japan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4088	China	United States, Taiwan	Deterrent warning
4089	North Korea	China	Minor skirmish/border violation
4090	Greece	Albania	Minor skirmish/border violation
4092	Turkey	Greece	Minor skirmish/border violation
4094	Turkey	Cyprus	Minor skirmish/border violation
4095	Turkey	Greece, Cyprus	Minor skirmish/border violation
4096	Russia	Georgia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4097	Albania	Macedonia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4098	Russia	Ukraine	Minor skirmish/border violation
4100	Yugoslavia	Croatia	Alert/exercise
4101	Hungary	Croatia	Alert/exercise
4102	Hungary	Yugoslavia	Alert/exercise
4103	Russia	Latvia	Alert/exercise
4104	China	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4105	Russia	Lithuania	Minor skirmish/border violation
4106	Russia	Poland	Maritime incident
4107	Russia	Poland	Maritime incident
4108	Ukraine	Romania	Alert/exercise
4109	Azerbaijan	Georgia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4111	Russia	Latvia	Alert/exercise
4113	Iran	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4114	Saudi Arabia	Yemen	Minor skirmish/border violation
4116	Togo	Ghana	Alert/exercise
4117	Botswana	Namibia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4118	Tanzania	Burundi	Deterrent warning

Table 1. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Dispute No.</i>	<i>Side A</i>	<i>Side B</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
4119	Cameroon	Nigeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
4121	Eritrea	Yemen	Compellent threat
4122	Dem. Rep. Congo	Rwanda	Minor skirmish/border violation
4123	Burundi	Tanzania	Minor skirmish/border violation
4124	Eritrea	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4125	United States, South Korea	North Korea	Alert/exercise
4126	South Korea	Japan	Alert/exercise
4127	Japan	South Korea	Maritime incident
4128	Philippines	China	Maritime incident
4130	Ethiopia	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4132	Eritrea	Yemen	Maritime incident
4134	Egypt	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4135	Thailand	Cambodia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4136	Yugoslavia	Albania	Alert/exercise
4137	United States + 23 others	Yugoslavia	Compellent threat
4138	Myanmar	Thailand	Maritime incident
4140	Nicaragua	Honduras	Alert/exercise
4141	Honduras	Nicaragua	Minor skirmish/border violation
4143	Peru	Ecuador	Minor skirmish/border violation
4144	Ecuador	Peru	Minor skirmish/border violation
4145	Nicaragua	Colombia	Maritime incident
4146	Costa Rica	Nicaragua	Minor skirmish/border violation
4147	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Alert/exercise
4148	United Kingdom	Chile	Maritime incident
4149	Venezuela	Trinidad and Tobago	Maritime incident
4150	Belize	Guatemala	Minor skirmish/border violation
4151	Guatemala	Belize	Minor skirmish/border violation
4152	Belize	Guatemala	Minor skirmish/border violation
4153	El Salvador	Nicaragua	Maritime incident
4154	Venezuela	Trinidad and Tobago	Maritime incident
4155	Venezuela	Trinidad and Tobago	Maritime incident
4156	Suriname	Guyana	Minor skirmish/border violation
4157	Suriname	Guyana	Maritime incident
4158	Turkey	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4159	Iran	Afghanistan	Alert/exercise
4160	Afghanistan	Iran	Compellent threat
4161	Iran	Afghanistan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4162	South Africa	Lesotho	Compellent threat
4163	Togo	Ghana	Alert/exercise
4164	Libya	Chad	Alert/exercise
4165	Cameroon	Nigeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
4166	Cameroon	Nigeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
4168	Angola	Congo	Minor skirmish/border violation
4169	Swaziland	Mozambique	Minor skirmish/border violation
4170	Dem. Rep. Congo	Uganda	Minor skirmish/border violation
4171	Nicaragua	Honduras	Maritime incident
4172	Venezuela	Colombia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4173	Turkey	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4174	United States	Russia	Maritime incident
4175	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4176	Russia + 3 others	Afghanistan	Alert/exercise

Table 1. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Dispute No.</i>	<i>Side A</i>	<i>Side B</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
4177	Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4178	China	Mongolia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4179	Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4180	China	Japan	Alert/exercise
4182	Israel	Syria, Lebanon	Minor skirmish/border violation
4183	Canada	United States	Maritime incident
4186	United States + 37 others	Yugoslavia	Deterrent warning
4187	Djibouti	Eritrea	Alert/exercise
4188	Ethiopia	Kenya	Minor skirmish/border violation
4189	Ecuador	Peru	Minor skirmish/border violation
4190	Syria	United States, Turkey	Alert/exercise
4191	Turkey	Iran	Minor skirmish/border violation
4192	Iran	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4193	Greece	Turkey	Minor skirmish/border violation
4195	United States	Libya	Deterrent warning
4197	Russia	United States, Canada	Alert/exercise
4200	Eritrea	Yemen	Maritime incident
4201	Russia, Uzbekistan	Afghanistan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4203	Saudi Arabia	Yemen	Nonmilitarized episode
4205	Iran	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4206	Turkey	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4208	Turkey	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4210	Turkey	Greece	Minor skirmish/border violation
4212	Russia	Georgia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4213	United States	Russia	Maritime incident
4214	Equatorial Guinea	Lithuania	Maritime incident
4215	Kuwait	Iraq	Alert/exercise
4216	United States	Iran	Deterrent warning
4217	United States	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4218	North Korea	United States, South Korea	Deterrent warning
4219	Venezuela	Colombia	Maritime incident
4220	Russia	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
4221	Turkey	Russia, Armenia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4222	Russia	Japan	Maritime incident
4223	India	Pakistan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4224	Turkey	Yugoslavia	Deterrent warning
4225	North Korea	Japan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4226	North Korea	Japan	Alert/exercise
4227	United States	Afghanistan	Compellent threat
4228	Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan	Afghanistan	Alert/exercise
4229	Albania	Yugoslavia	Alert/exercise
4230	Croatia	Yugoslavia	Alert/exercise
4231	Croatia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Nonmilitarized episode
4232	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4233	Greece	Turkey	Alert/exercise
4235	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4236	Azerbaijan	Armenia	Compellent threat
4237	Lesotho	South Africa	Alert/exercise
4238	Norway	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4239	Russia	Japan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4240	Belarus	Lithuania	Alert/exercise

Table 1. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Dispute No.</i>	<i>Side A</i>	<i>Side B</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
4242	Russia	Georgia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4243	Palau	Philippines	Maritime incident
4244	Angola	Dem. Rep. Congo	Alert/exercise
4245	Dem. Rep. Congo	Congo	Minor skirmish/border violation
4246	Angola	Congo	Minor skirmish/border violation
4248	Sudan	Uganda	Minor skirmish/border violation
4249	Kenya	Uganda	Alert/exercise
4250	Cameroon	Nigeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
4251	Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana	Sierra Leone	Minor skirmish/border violation
4252	Uganda	Rwanda	Minor skirmish/border violation
4253	Uganda	Rwanda	Minor skirmish/border violation
4254	United States	Liberia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4255	Nigeria	Liberia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4256	Nigeria, Sierra Leone	Liberia	Compellent threat
4257	Liberia	Guinea	Minor skirmish/border violation
4258	Eritrea	Ethiopia	War/wartime campaign
4259	Honduras	Nicaragua	Alert/exercise
4260	Venezuela	Guyana	Alert/exercise
4261	United States	Venezuela	Minor skirmish/border violation
4262	Venezuela	Colombia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4263	Colombia	Nicaragua	Maritime incident
4264	Australia	Indonesia	Alert/exercise
4265	New Zealand	Indonesia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4266	Japan	North Korea	Minor skirmish/border violation
4269	United States + 6 others	Iraq	Alert/exercise
4270	United States	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4271	United States, United Kingdom, Kuwait	Iraq	Alert/exercise
4272	Kuwait	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4273	United States + 13 others	Iraq	Compellent threat
4274	Iraq	Kuwait	Alert/exercise
4275	Kuwait	Iraq	Alert/exercise
4277	Pakistan	India	Compellent threat
4278	China	Australia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4279	China	Philippines	Alert/exercise
4280	China	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
4281	China	United States, Taiwan	Deterrent warning
4282	North Korea	South Korea	Minor skirmish/border violation
4283	United States + 14 others	Afghanistan	Compellent threat
4284	Central African Republic	Chad	Alert/exercise
4285	Armenia	Iran	Minor skirmish/border violation
4286	Sudan	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
4287	Sudan	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
4288	Egypt	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4289	Turkey	Iran	Minor skirmish/border violation
4290	Turkey	Iran	Alert/exercise
4291	Turkey	Syria	Compellent threat
4292	Iran	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4293	Qatar	Saudi Arabia	Alert/exercise
4295	Yugoslavia	United Kingdom, Canada	Nonmilitarized episode
4296	Australia	Norway	Minor skirmish/border violation

Table 1. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Dispute No.</i>	<i>Side A</i>	<i>Side B</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
4297	Russia	Japan	Maritime incident
4298	Yugoslavia	United States, Croatia	Maritime incident
4299	United States	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4300	Guinea	Sierra Leone	Minor skirmish/border violation
4301	Sierra Leone	Liberia	Nonmilitarized episode
4302	Guinea	Liberia	Alert/exercise
4303	Angola	Zambia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4304	Sudan	Uganda	Minor skirmish/border violation
4305	Uganda	Sudan	Alert/exercise
4306	Central African Republic	Cameroon	Minor skirmish/border violation
4307	Dem. Rep. Congo	Zambia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4308	Niger	Mali	Minor skirmish/border violation
4309	Guinea	Ivory Coast	Minor skirmish/border violation
4310	Uganda	Rwanda	Alert/exercise
4311	Tanzania	Burundi	Alert/exercise
4312	Nigeria	Benin	Minor skirmish/border violation
4313	India	Bangladesh	Alert/exercise
4314	Myanmar	Thailand	Minor skirmish/border violation
4315	Syria	Turkey	Minor skirmish/border violation
4317	Iran	Azerbaijan	Nonmilitarized episode
4318	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4319	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Minor skirmish/border violation
4320	Greece	Turkey	Nonmilitarized episode
4321	Norway	Russia	Maritime incident
4322	Japan	North Korea	Alert/exercise
4323	Turkey	Greece	Minor skirmish/border violation
4324	Turkey	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4325	Turkey	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
4327	Honduras	Nicaragua	Alert/exercise
4328	Vietnam	China	Minor skirmish/border violation
4329	Philippines	Vietnam	Alert/exercise
4330	Vietnam	Philippines	Minor skirmish/border violation
4331	Taiwan	Vietnam	Alert/exercise
4332	Hungary	Yugoslavia	Alert/exercise
4333	Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Minor skirmish/border violation
4334	United Kingdom	Russia	Alert/exercise
4335	Norway	Russia	Alert/exercise
4336	China	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
4337	Iran	Turkey	Alert/exercise
4338	Azerbaijan	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4339	Dem. Rep. Congo + 4 others	Rwanda, Uganda	Nonmilitarized episode

Table 1. *Classification of threats and nonthreats in the MID dataset.*

ICB

We determined the frequency of coercive threats in the ICB dataset by using the actor-level version of the dataset, which contains 1,000 crisis observations (identified by the “crisis actor”) and covers 455 crises between 1918 and 2007 (version 10).³ With a few exceptions, each observation contains one interstate dyad. We then classified each observation into the seven categories described above.

Following the approach of Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001), we identified the state listed by ICB as the “source of threat to values” (SOUTHV) as the challenger, and the state listed as the “crisis actor” (ACTOR) as the target. For a state to be coded as issuing a compellent threat, it must be listed as the challenger in the ICB dataset. Conversely, for a state to be coded as issuing a deterrent threat, it must be coded as the target. If a threat of either type was issued by the appropriate actor, we coded the observation as a threat no matter what other actions were taken during the crisis.

Our classifications of ICB crisis dyads are listed in Table 2.

³The ICB dataset is available online at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb>.

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
1	France	Russia	Nonmilitarized episode
2	Costa Rica	Nicaragua	Alert/exercise
2	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Nonmilitarized episode
3	United Kingdom	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4	Estonia	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4	Russia	Estonia	Minor skirmish/border violation
4	Russia	Lithuania	Minor skirmish/border violation
4	Russia	Latvia	Minor skirmish/border violation
5	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Minor skirmish/border violation
5	Czechoslovakia	Poland	Compellent threat
6	Romania	Hungary	War/wartime campaign
6	Hungary	Czechoslovakia	War/wartime campaign
6	France	Hungary	Compellent threat
6	Hungary	Romania	War/wartime campaign
7	Italy	Greece	Minor skirmish/border violation
7	Greece	Italy	Minor skirmish/border violation
8	United Kingdom	Afghanistan	War/wartime campaign
8	Afghanistan	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
9	Finland	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
9	Russia	Finland	Minor skirmish/border violation
10	Romania	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
10	Russia	Romania	Compellent threat
11	France	Turkey	War/wartime campaign
11	Turkey	France	War/wartime campaign
12	Germany	France	Alert/exercise
12	France	Germany	Compellent threat
13	Poland	Russia	Compellent threat
13	Russia	Poland	War/wartime campaign
14	United Kingdom	Russia	Minor skirmish/border violation
14	Russia	Iran	Minor skirmish/border violation
15	Finland	Sweden	Alert/exercise
15	Sweden	Finland	Nonmilitarized episode
16	Greece	Turkey	War/wartime campaign
17	Lithuania	Poland	War/wartime campaign
17	Poland	Lithuania	War/wartime campaign
18	Greece	Turkey	War/wartime campaign
19	Costa Rica	Panama	Compellent threat
19	Panama	Costa Rica	Minor skirmish/border violation
20	Belgium, Netherlands	Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
20	France	Belgium	Nonmilitarized episode
20	Belgium	Netherlands	Nonmilitarized episode
21	Hungary	Czechoslovakia	Nonmilitarized episode
21	Hungary	Yugoslavia	Nonmilitarized episode
21	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Compellent threat
21	Hungary	Yugoslavia	Nonmilitarized episode
21	Hungary	Czechoslovakia	Nonmilitarized episode
21	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Compellent threat
22	Germany	Yugoslavia	Deterrent warning
22	France	Austria	Nonmilitarized episode
23	Yugoslavia	Albania	Minor skirmish/border violation
23	Albania	Yugoslavia	Minor skirmish/border violation

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
24	Austria	Hungary	Minor skirmish/border violation
24	Hungary	Austria	Minor skirmish/border violation
25	Turkey	Greece	War/wartime campaign
26	United Kingdom	Turkey	Alert/exercise
26	Turkey	United Kingdom	Compellent threat
27	Soviet Union	Poland	Nonmilitarized episode
27	France	Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
27	France	Netherlands	Nonmilitarized episode
28	Italy	Greece	Compellent threat
29	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	War/wartime campaign
29	Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia	War/wartime campaign
30	France	Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
30	Germany	France	Nonmilitarized episode
31	United Kingdom	Turkey	Compellent threat
31	Turkey	United Kingdom	Minor skirmish/border violation
32	Bulgaria	Greece	Minor skirmish/border violation
32	Greece	Bulgaria	Compellent threat
33	Mexico	Nicaragua	Nonmilitarized episode
34	Italy	Yugoslavia	Alert/exercise
34	Yugoslavia	Albania	Alert/exercise
34	Yugoslavia	Italy	Alert/exercise
35	China	China	Nonmilitarized episode
35	China	Japan	Minor skirmish/border violation
36	Poland	Lithuania	Nonmilitarized episode
36	Lithuania	Poland	Nonmilitarized episode
37	Paraguay	Bolivia	Minor skirmish/border violation
37	Bolivia	Paraguay	Minor skirmish/border violation
38	China	Soviet Union	War/wartime campaign
38	Soviet Union	China	Compellent threat
39	Japan	China	Compellent threat
39	China	Japan	War/wartime campaign
40	Japan	China	Compellent threat
40	China	Japan	War/wartime campaign
41	Bolivia	Paraguay	War/wartime campaign
41	Paraguay	Bolivia	War/wartime campaign
42	Peru	Colombia	Minor skirmish/border violation
42	Colombia	Peru	Minor skirmish/border violation
43	Japan	China	Compellent threat
44	Yemen Arab Republic	Saudi Arabia	War/wartime campaign
44	Saudi Arabia	Yemen Arab Republic	War/wartime campaign
45	Germany	Austria	Nonmilitarized episode
45	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Nonmilitarized episode
45	Germany	Italy	Deterrent warning
45	Italy	Yugoslavia	Alert/exercise
46	Hungary	Yugoslavia	Nonmilitarized episode
46	Yugoslavia	Hungary	Nonmilitarized episode
47	Italy	Ethiopia	Compellent threat
47	Italy	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
47	Germany	France	Nonmilitarized episode
47	United Kingdom	Italy	Alert/exercise
48	Turkey	Bulgaria	Alert/exercise
48	Bulgaria	Turkey	Nonmilitarized episode

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
48	Turkey	Bulgaria	Alert/exercise
49	Germany	Lithuania	Alert/exercise
50	Ecuador	Peru	Alert/exercise
50	Peru	Ecuador	Alert/exercise
51	Germany	Belgium	Nonmilitarized episode
51	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Nonmilitarized episode
51	Germany	Poland	Nonmilitarized episode
51	Germany	Romania	Nonmilitarized episode
51	Germany	Yugoslavia	Nonmilitarized episode
51	Germany	France	Alert/exercise
51	Germany	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
52	Italy	Spain	Nonmilitarized episode
53	France	Turkey	Alert/exercise
53	Turkey	France	Compellent threat
54	Spain	Italy	Minor skirmish/border violation
54	Spain	Germany	Minor skirmish/border violation
54	Germany	Spain	Minor skirmish/border violation
55	Soviet Union	Japan	Alert/exercise
55	Japan	Soviet Union	Compellent threat
56	Japan	China	Compellent threat
56	China	Japan	War/wartime campaign
57	Nicaragua	Honduras	Nonmilitarized episode
57	Honduras	Nicaragua	Alert/exercise
58	Dominican Republic	Haiti	Alert/exercise
59	Japan	United States	Alert/exercise
60	Germany	Austria	Compellent threat
60	Austria	Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
61	Poland	Lithuania	Compellent threat
62	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Alert/exercise
62	Germany	France	Deterrent warning
62	Germany	United Kingdom	Deterrent warning
62	Czechoslovakia	Germany	Alert/exercise
63	Soviet Union	Japan	War/wartime campaign
63	Japan	Soviet Union	Compellent threat
64	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Compellent threat
64	Germany	France	Alert/exercise
64	Germany	United Kingdom	Alert/exercise
64	Germany	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
65	Italy	Spain	War/wartime campaign
66	Italy	France	Nonmilitarized episode
67	Italy	Spain	War/wartime campaign
68	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Compellent threat
69	Germany	Lithuania	Compellent threat
70	Germany	Poland	Compellent threat
71	Italy	Albania	Compellent threat
71	Italy	France	Alert/exercise
71	Italy	Greece	Alert/exercise
71	Italy	United Kingdom	Alert/exercise
72	Japan	Soviet Union	Deterrent warning
72	Soviet Union	Japan	War/wartime campaign
73	Japan	United Kingdom	Compellent threat
74	Germany	Latvia	Nonmilitarized episode

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
74	Soviet Union	Japan	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	United Kingdom	Compellent threat
74	Germany	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	Luxembourg	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	Switzerland	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	Denmark	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Soviet Union	Estonia	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Soviet Union	Finland	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	Norway	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Soviet Union	Romania	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	Sweden	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	Lithuania	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	Australia	War/wartime campaign
74	Germany	Belgium	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	France	Compellent threat
74	Germany	Netherlands	Nonmilitarized episode
74	Germany	New Zealand	War/wartime campaign
74	Germany	Canada	War/wartime campaign
74	Germany	Poland	Compellent threat
74	Germany	South Africa	War/wartime campaign
75	Soviet Union	Estonia	Compellent threat
75	Soviet Union	Latvia	Compellent threat
75	Soviet Union	Lithuania	Compellent threat
76	Soviet Union	Finland	Compellent threat
76	Germany	Sweden	Nonmilitarized episode
76	Germany	France	Nonmilitarized episode
76	Germany	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
77	Germany	Norway	Compellent threat
77	Germany	Denmark	Compellent threat
77	Germany	Netherlands	Alert/exercise
77	Germany	France	War/wartime campaign
77	Germany	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
78	Germany	Luxembourg	War/wartime campaign
78	Germany	Netherlands	War/wartime campaign
78	Germany	Belgium	War/wartime campaign
78	Germany	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
78	Germany	France	War/wartime campaign
79	Japan	United Kingdom	Compellent threat
80	Soviet Union	Romania	Compellent threat
80	Hungary	Romania	Compellent threat
80	Bulgaria	Romania	Minor skirmish/border violation
81	Germany	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
82	Italy	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
82	United Kingdom	Italy	War/wartime campaign
83	Italy	Greece	Compellent threat
83	Italy	Yugoslavia	Alert/exercise
83	Italy	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
83	Bulgaria	Turkey	Alert/exercise
83	Greece	Italy	War/wartime campaign
83	United Kingdom	Germany	War/wartime campaign
83	Germany	Yugoslavia	War/wartime campaign
83	Germany	Greece	Compellent threat

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
83	Germany	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
84	United Kingdom	Iraq	Compellent threat
84	Germany	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
84	United Kingdom	Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
84	United Kingdom	Luxembourg	Minor skirmish/border violation
85	Germany	Soviet Union	War/wartime campaign
85	Germany	Soviet Union	War/wartime campaign
86	Peru	Ecuador	Minor skirmish/border violation
86	Ecuador	Peru	Minor skirmish/border violation
87	Soviet Union	Iran	Compellent threat
88	United States	Japan	War/wartime campaign
88	Japan	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
88	Japan	Netherlands	War/wartime campaign
88	Japan	Australia	War/wartime campaign
88	Japan	New Zealand	War/wartime campaign
88	Japan	Canada	War/wartime campaign
88	Japan	United States	War/wartime campaign
88	Japan	Thailand	War/wartime campaign
88	United States	Germany	War/wartime campaign
88	United States	Italy	War/wartime campaign
89	Germany	Soviet Union	War/wartime campaign
89	Soviet Union	Germany	War/wartime campaign
90	United Kingdom	Germany	War/wartime campaign
90	United Kingdom	Italy	War/wartime campaign
91	United Kingdom	Italy	War/wartime campaign
91	United Kingdom	Germany	War/wartime campaign
92	Germany	Hungary	Minor skirmish/border violation
93	Soviet Union	Romania	War/wartime campaign
93	Soviet Union	Germany	War/wartime campaign
93	Soviet Union	Hungary	War/wartime campaign
93	Soviet Union	Germany	War/wartime campaign
94	United States	Germany	War/wartime campaign
95	United States	Japan	War/wartime campaign
96	Soviet Union	Iran	Compellent threat
97	United States	Japan	War/wartime campaign
98	Soviet Union	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
99	United States	Japan	War/wartime campaign
100	Soviet Union	Germany	War/wartime campaign
101	United States	Japan	War/wartime campaign
102	Romania	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
102	Soviet Union	Romania	Compellent threat
103	United States	Japan	War/wartime campaign
104	Yugoslavia	United Kingdom	Alert/exercise
104	Yugoslavia	United States	Alert/exercise
104	United States	Yugoslavia	Alert/exercise
105	France	Syria	Minor skirmish/border violation
105	United Kingdom	France	Compellent threat
106	Soviet Union	Turkey	Compellent threat
107	United States	Japan	War/wartime campaign
108	Soviet Union	Iran	Compellent threat
108	Soviet Union	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
108	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
108	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
109	Indonesia	Netherlands	Nonmilitarized episode
109	Netherlands	Indonesia	Nonmilitarized episode
110	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
111	Soviet Union	Turkey	Compellent threat
111	Soviet Union	United States	Alert/exercise
112	Yugoslavia	Greece	Nonmilitarized episode
113	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
113	Soviet Union	Hungary	Nonmilitarized episode
114	Soviet Union	Greece	Nonmilitarized episode
114	Soviet Union	Turkey	Nonmilitarized episode
114	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
115	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
115	Soviet Union	Czechoslovakia	Nonmilitarized episode
116	Netherlands	Indonesia	Nonmilitarized episode
116	Indonesia	Netherlands	Nonmilitarized episode
117	Cuba	Dominican Republic	Nonmilitarized episode
118	Pakistan	India	Nonmilitarized episode
118	India	Pakistan	Compellent threat
119	Pakistan	India	War/wartime campaign
119	India	Pakistan	War/wartime campaign
120	Israel	Iraq	War/wartime campaign
120	Israel	Egypt	War/wartime campaign
120	Israel	Lebanon	War/wartime campaign
120	Israel	Jordan	War/wartime campaign
120	Israel	Syria	War/wartime campaign
120	Egypt	Israel	War/wartime campaign
121	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
121	Soviet Union	Czechoslovakia	Nonmilitarized episode
122	Soviet Union	Finland	Nonmilitarized episode
123	United States	Soviet Union	Alert/exercise
123	Soviet Union	France	Alert/exercise
123	Soviet Union	United Kingdom	Alert/exercise
123	Soviet Union	United States	Alert/exercise
124	Pakistan	India	Nonmilitarized episode
125	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
125	China	China	Nonmilitarized episode
126	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Minor skirmish/border violation
127	Netherlands	Indonesia	Nonmilitarized episode
127	Indonesia	Netherlands	Nonmilitarized episode
128	Israel	Egypt	War/wartime campaign
128	Israel	United Kingdom	Minor skirmish/border violation
128	United Kingdom	Israel	Compellent threat
129	Pakistan	Afghanistan	Minor skirmish/border violation
129	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Minor skirmish/border violation
130	Cuba	Dominican Republic	Nonmilitarized episode
131	Soviet Union	Yugoslavia	Compellent threat
132	North Korea	South Korea	War/wartime campaign
132	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
132	United States	China	Nonmilitarized episode
132	China	Taiwan	Alert/exercise

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
133	United States	North Korea	War/wartime campaign
133	United States	China	Deterrent warning
133	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
133	China	United States	War/wartime campaign
133	North Korea	South Korea	War/wartime campaign
134	Israel	Syria	Minor skirmish/border violation
134	Syria	Israel	Minor skirmish/border violation
135	Pakistan	India	Alert/exercise
135	India	Pakistan	Alert/exercise
136	United Kingdom	Egypt	Minor skirmish/border violation
136	Egypt	United Kingdom	Minor skirmish/border violation
137	Soviet Union	Sweden	Minor skirmish/border violation
138	Taiwan	Myanmar	Nonmilitarized episode
139	Vietnam	France	Nonmilitarized episode
139	Vietnam	Laos	Nonmilitarized episode
140	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
140	United States	China	War/wartime campaign
140	South Korea	North Korea	War/wartime campaign
140	North Korea	South Korea	War/wartime campaign
141	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
142	Italy	Yugoslavia	Deterrent warning
142	Yugoslavia	Italy	Alert/exercise
143	Israel	Jordan	Minor skirmish/border violation
144	United States	Guatemala	Nonmilitarized episode
144	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
144	Guatemala	Honduras	Nonmilitarized episode
145	Vietnam	France	Nonmilitarized episode
145	Vietnam	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
145	Vietnam	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
146	United States	China	Deterrent warning
146	China	Taiwan	Minor skirmish/border violation
146	China	United States	Alert/exercise
146	China	Taiwan	Minor skirmish/border violation
147	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Alert/exercise
147	Costa Rica	Nicaragua	Nonmilitarized episode
148	United States	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
149	Israel	Egypt	Minor skirmish/border violation
149	Egypt	Israel	Minor skirmish/border violation
150	Pakistan	Afghanistan	Alert/exercise
150	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Alert/exercise
151	India	Portugal	Nonmilitarized episode
152	Egypt	France	War/wartime campaign
152	Egypt	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
152	Israel	Egypt	War/wartime campaign
152	Israel	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
152	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
152	Soviet Union	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
153	Israel	Jordan	Minor skirmish/border violation
153	Iraq	Israel	Deterrent warning
154	Poland	Soviet Union	Deterrent warning
154	Soviet Union	Poland	Nonmilitarized episode
155	Hungary	Soviet Union	War/wartime campaign

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
155	Soviet Union	Hungary	War/wartime campaign
156	Honduras	Nicaragua	Minor skirmish/border violation
156	Nicaragua	Honduras	Minor skirmish/border violation
157	Egypt	Jordan	Nonmilitarized episode
158	France	Tunisia	Minor skirmish/border violation
159	Soviet Union	Turkey	Nonmilitarized episode
159	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
159	United States	Syria	Nonmilitarized episode
160	Morocco	Spain	Compellent threat
161	Indonesia	Netherlands	Nonmilitarized episode
162	Egypt	Iraq	Nonmilitarized episode
162	Egypt	Jordan	Nonmilitarized episode
163	Egypt	United States	Alert/exercise
164	United States	Indonesia	Nonmilitarized episode
165	Egypt	Lebanon	Nonmilitarized episode
165	Egypt	Jordan	Nonmilitarized episode
165	Egypt	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
165	Egypt	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
166	China	Taiwan	Minor skirmish/border violation
166	China	United States	Deterrent warning
166	United States	China	Nonmilitarized episode
167	Cambodia	Thailand	Nonmilitarized episode
167	Thailand	Cambodia	Nonmilitarized episode
168	Soviet Union	France	Nonmilitarized episode
168	Soviet Union	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
168	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
168	Soviet Union	West Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
168	United States	East Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
168	United States	Soviet Union	Alert/exercise
169	Mexico	Guatemala	Maritime incident
169	Guatemala	Mexico	Maritime incident
170	Cuba	Panama	Nonmilitarized episode
170	Cuba	Nicaragua	Nonmilitarized episode
170	Cuba	Dominican Republic	Nonmilitarized episode
170	Cuba	Haiti	Nonmilitarized episode
171	India	China	Alert/exercise
171	China	India	Compellent threat
172	Iran	Iraq	Compellent threat
172	Iraq	Iran	Minor skirmish/border violation
173	Israel	Egypt	Alert/exercise
173	Egypt	Israel	Alert/exercise
174	Togo	Ghana	Nonmilitarized episode
175	Dominican Republic	Venezuela	Alert/exercise
175	Venezuela	Dominican Republic	Alert/exercise
176	Congo	Belgium	Nonmilitarized episode
176	Belgium	Dem. Rep. Congo	Alert/exercise
176	Belgium	Dem. Rep. Congo	Alert/exercise
177	Senegal	Mali	Nonmilitarized episode
177	Mali	Senegal	Nonmilitarized episode
178	Cuba	Nicaragua	Nonmilitarized episode
178	Cuba	Guatemala	Nonmilitarized episode
179	Somalia	Ethiopia	Minor skirmish/border violation

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
180	Vietnam	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
180	Vietnam	Thailand	Deterrent warning
181	United States	Cuba	Nonmilitarized episode
181	Cuba	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
182	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Nonmilitarized episode
182	Pakistan	Afghanistan	Minor skirmish/border violation
183	United Kingdom	Iraq	Nonmilitarized episode
183	Iraq	Kuwait	Alert/exercise
183	Iraq	United Kingdom	Deterrent warning
184	Tunisia	France	Minor skirmish/border violation
184	France	Tunisia	Minor skirmish/border violation
185	West Germany	East Germany	Alert/exercise
185	United States	Soviet Union	Alert/exercise
185	Soviet Union	France	Alert/exercise
185	Soviet Union	United Kingdom	Alert/exercise
185	Soviet Union	West Germany	Alert/exercise
185	Soviet Union	United States	Alert/exercise
186	Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	Nonmilitarized episode
186	Vietnam	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
187	Netherlands	Indonesia	Minor skirmish/border violation
187	Indonesia	Netherlands	Compellent threat
188	Syria	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
189	Soviet Union	Finland	Nonmilitarized episode
190	India	Portugal	Compellent threat
191	Morocco	Mauritania	Nonmilitarized episode
192	United States	China	Nonmilitarized episode
193	Vietnam	Thailand	Nonmilitarized episode
193	Vietnam	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
194	China	India	War/wartime campaign
194	India	China	Compellent threat
194	China	India	War/wartime campaign
195	Egypt	Jordan	Nonmilitarized episode
195	Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Minor skirmish/border violation
195	Saudi Arabia	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
195	Saudi Arabia	Yemen Arab Republic	Deterrent warning
196	Soviet Union	United States	Alert/exercise
196	United States	Cuba	Alert/exercise
196	United States	Soviet Union	Compellent threat
197	Indonesia	Malaysia	Minor skirmish/border violation
197	Malaysia	Indonesia	Minor skirmish/border violation
198	Haiti	Dominican Republic	Nonmilitarized episode
198	Dominican Republic	Haiti	Compellent threat
199	Morocco	Algeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
199	Algeria	Morocco	Minor skirmish/border violation
200	Cuba	Venezuela	Nonmilitarized episode
201	Somalia	Kenya	Nonmilitarized episode
202	Greece	Turkey	Compellent threat
202	Turkey	Cyprus	Compellent threat
202	Turkey	Greece	Deterrent warning
203	Israel	Jordan	Nonmilitarized episode
203	Israel	Lebanon	Nonmilitarized episode
203	Israel	Syria	Nonmilitarized episode

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
203	Israel	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
203	Syria	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
204	Benin	Niger	Alert/exercise
204	Niger	Benin	Alert/exercise
205	Burundi	Rwanda	Nonmilitarized episode
205	Rwanda	Burundi	Nonmilitarized episode
206	United States	Panama	Nonmilitarized episode
206	Panama	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
207	Uganda	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
208	Somalia	Ethiopia	Minor skirmish/border violation
208	Ethiopia	Somalia	Minor skirmish/border violation
209	Saudi Arabia	Yemen Arab Republic	Minor skirmish/border violation
209	Saudi Arabia	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
209	Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Nonmilitarized episode
210	United States	Vietnam	Compellent threat
210	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
211	Soviet Union	Dem. Rep. Congo	Nonmilitarized episode
211	Dem. Rep. Congo	Belgium	Nonmilitarized episode
211	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
211	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
212	Saudi Arabia	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
212	Saudi Arabia	Yemen Arab Republic	Minor skirmish/border violation
212	Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Nonmilitarized episode
213	Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
213	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
213	United States	Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
214	Pakistan	India	Minor skirmish/border violation
214	India	Pakistan	Compellent threat
215	Dominican Republic	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
216	Pakistan	India	Compellent threat
216	India	Pakistan	War/wartime campaign
216	China	India	Compellent threat
217	Ivory Coast	Guinea	Nonmilitarized episode
218	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Deterrent warning
219	Egypt	Saudi Arabia	Compellent threat
219	Saudi Arabia	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
219	Saudi Arabia	Yemen Arab Republic	Minor skirmish/border violation
220	Jordan	Israel	Minor skirmish/border violation
220	Israel	Jordan	Minor skirmish/border violation
221	Cuba	Bolivia	Nonmilitarized episode
222	Egypt	Israel	War/wartime campaign
222	Israel	Jordan	War/wartime campaign
222	Israel	Egypt	Compellent threat
222	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
222	Israel	Syria	War/wartime campaign
222	Israel	Soviet Union	Deterrent warning
223	Greece	Turkey	Nonmilitarized episode
223	Turkey	Greece	Compellent threat
223	Turkey	Cyprus	Nonmilitarized episode
224	North Korea	South Korea	Nonmilitarized episode
224	North Korea	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
224	United States	North Korea	Compellent threat

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
225	Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
225	Vietnam	United States	War/wartime campaign
226	Jordan	Israel	Minor skirmish/border violation
226	Israel	Jordan	Minor skirmish/border violation
227	Czechoslovakia	East Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
227	Czechoslovakia	Poland	Nonmilitarized episode
227	Czechoslovakia	Bulgaria	Nonmilitarized episode
227	Soviet Union	Hungary	Nonmilitarized episode
227	Czechoslovakia	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
227	Soviet Union	Czechoslovakia	Compellent threat
228	Venezuela	Guyana	Nonmilitarized episode
229	Israel	Lebanon	Deterrent warning
230	Vietnam	United States	War/wartime campaign
230	Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
231	China	Soviet Union	Minor skirmish/border violation
231	Soviet Union	China	Compellent threat
232	Egypt	Israel	Compellent threat
232	Israel	Egypt	War/wartime campaign
232	Israel	Egypt	War/wartime campaign
232	Israel	Soviet Union	Minor skirmish/border violation
232	Egypt	Israel	War/wartime campaign
233	North Korea	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
234	Iraq	Iran	Deterrent warning
234	Iran	Iraq	Alert/exercise
235	Honduras	El Salvador	War/wartime campaign
235	El Salvador	Honduras	War/wartime campaign
236	Syria	Lebanon	Nonmilitarized episode
237	United States	Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
237	Vietnam	Cambodia	War/wartime campaign
237	Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
237	Vietnam	United States	War/wartime campaign
238	Jordan	Syria	Minor skirmish/border violation
238	Syria	United States	Deterrent warning
238	Syria	Israel	Deterrent warning
238	Syria	Jordan	Minor skirmish/border violation
239	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
240	Portugal	Guinea	Minor skirmish/border violation
241	Republic of Vietnam	Laos	War/wartime campaign
241	Republic of Vietnam	Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
242	Pakistan	Bangladesh	Nonmilitarized episode
242	India	Pakistan	Deterrent warning
242	Pakistan	India	War/wartime campaign
242	India	Pakistan	War/wartime campaign
243	Chad	Libya	Nonmilitarized episode
243	Libya	Chad	Nonmilitarized episode
244	South Africa	Zambia	Alert/exercise
245	Uganda	Tanzania	Minor skirmish/border violation
245	Tanzania	Uganda	Deterrent warning
246	Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
246	Vietnam	United States	War/wartime campaign
246	Republic of Vietnam	Vietnam	War/wartime campaign

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
247	Tanzania	Uganda	Deterrent warning
247	Uganda	Tanzania	Minor skirmish/border violation
248	Yemen People's Republic	Yemen Arab Republic	Minor skirmish/border violation
248	Saudi Arabia	Yemen People's Republic	Minor skirmish/border violation
249	Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
249	Vietnam	United States	War/wartime campaign
249	Republic of Vietnam	Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
250	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Nonmilitarized episode
251	Libya	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
252	Iraq	Kuwait	Compellent threat
253	Egypt	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
254	Iceland	United Kingdom	Compellent threat
254	United Kingdom	Iceland	Alert/exercise
255	Egypt	Israel	War/wartime campaign
255	Egypt	Israel	War/wartime campaign
255	Israel	Syria	War/wartime campaign
255	Soviet Union	United States	Deterrent warning
255	Israel	Egypt	War/wartime campaign
255	Israel	Soviet Union	Deterrent warning
256	Yemen People's Republic	Oman	Minor skirmish/border violation
257	Turkey	Cyprus	War/wartime campaign
257	Greece	Turkey	War/wartime campaign
257	Turkey	Greece	War/wartime campaign
258	Vietnam	Republic of Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
258	Vietnam	Cambodia	War/wartime campaign
259	Cambodia	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
259	United States	Cambodia	Compellent threat
260	Angola	Zambia	Nonmilitarized episode
260	Angola	Dem. Rep. Congo	War/wartime campaign
260	Soviet Union	South Africa	Nonmilitarized episode
260	South Africa	Angola	War/wartime campaign
260	South Africa	Cuba	War/wartime campaign
260	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
260	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
261	Morocco	Spain	Compellent threat
261	Algeria	Morocco	Minor skirmish/border violation
261	Morocco	Algeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
261	Algeria	Mauritania	Compellent threat
262	Guatemala	United Kingdom	Deterrent warning
263	Iceland	United Kingdom	Compellent threat
263	United Kingdom	Iceland	Minor skirmish/border violation
264	Portugal	Indonesia	Nonmilitarized episode
265	Israel	Syria	Nonmilitarized episode
266	Uganda	Kenya	Deterrent warning
267	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Minor skirmish/border violation
267	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Minor skirmish/border violation
268	Algeria	Mauritania	Nonmilitarized episode
269	Iraq	Syria	Compellent threat
270	Syria	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
270	Israel	Uganda	Minor skirmish/border violation
271	Libya	Sudan	Nonmilitarized episode
272	Turkey	Greece	Nonmilitarized episode

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
272	Greece	Turkey	Alert/exercise
273	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Minor skirmish/border violation
274	North Korea	United States	Alert/exercise
274	United States	North Korea	Alert/exercise
275	Syria	Israel	Alert/exercise
276	Zimbabwe	Botswana	Minor skirmish/border violation
277	Angola	Dem. Rep. Congo	Nonmilitarized episode
277	Dem. Rep. Congo	Angola	Nonmilitarized episode
278	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Minor skirmish/border violation
279	Guatemala	United Kingdom	Alert/exercise
280	Algeria	Mauritania	Nonmilitarized episode
281	United States	Libya	Nonmilitarized episode
281	Libya	Egypt	Compellent threat
282	Somalia	Ethiopia	War/wartime campaign
282	Soviet Union	Somalia	Nonmilitarized episode
283	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Minor skirmish/border violation
284	Vietnam	Cambodia	War/wartime campaign
284	Cambodia	Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
284	Cambodia	Thailand	Nonmilitarized episode
285	Algeria	France	Nonmilitarized episode
285	France	Algeria	Nonmilitarized episode
286	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Minor skirmish/border violation
287	Argentina	Chile	Compellent threat
287	Chile	Argentina	Alert/exercise
288	Chad	Libya	Nonmilitarized episode
288	Libya	Chad	Nonmilitarized episode
289	Israel	Lebanon	Nonmilitarized episode
290	Libya	France	Nonmilitarized episode
290	France	Libya	Nonmilitarized episode
290	Libya	Chad	Minor skirmish/border violation
291	Angola	South Africa	Minor skirmish/border violation
291	South Africa	Angola	Minor skirmish/border violation
292	Angola	Dem. Rep. Congo	Nonmilitarized episode
292	Dem. Rep. Congo	Angola	Nonmilitarized episode
292	Angola	Belgium	Nonmilitarized episode
292	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
292	Angola	France	Nonmilitarized episode
293	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Minor skirmish/border violation
293	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Minor skirmish/border violation
294	Costa Rica	Nicaragua	Minor skirmish/border violation
294	Nicaragua	Costa Rica	Compellent threat
294	Costa Rica	Nicaragua	Minor skirmish/border violation
295	Argentina	Chile	Compellent threat
295	Chile	Argentina	Alert/exercise
296	Uganda	Tanzania	War/wartime campaign
296	Tanzania	Uganda	War/wartime campaign
296	Tanzania	Libya	War/wartime campaign
297	South Africa	Angola	Alert/exercise
298	Soviet Union	China	Nonmilitarized episode
298	China	Vietnam	Compellent threat
299	Algeria	Morocco	Nonmilitarized episode
300	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Nonmilitarized episode

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
300	Zimbabwe	Angola	Nonmilitarized episode
300	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Nonmilitarized episode
301	Yemen People's Republic	Yemen Arab Republic	Minor skirmish/border violation
301	Saudi Arabia	Yemen People's Republic	Minor skirmish/border violation
302	South Africa	Angola	Nonmilitarized episode
303	United States	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
303	Soviet Union	Afghanistan	Minor skirmish/border violation
303	Soviet Union	Pakistan	Nonmilitarized episode
303	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
304	Chad	Libya	Minor skirmish/border violation
304	Libya	Chad	Compellent threat
304	Libya	France	Minor skirmish/border violation
305	Algeria	Morocco	Nonmilitarized episode
305	Morocco	Algeria	Nonmilitarized episode
306	Soviet Union	Pakistan	Nonmilitarized episode
307	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Minor skirmish/border violation
307	Zimbabwe	Botswana	Minor skirmish/border violation
307	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Minor skirmish/border violation
307	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Minor skirmish/border violation
308	South Africa	Angola	Nonmilitarized episode
309	Iran	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
309	United States	Iran	Compellent threat
310	Nicaragua	Colombia	Nonmilitarized episode
310	Colombia	Nicaragua	Alert/exercise
311	Libya	Tunisia	Nonmilitarized episode
311	France	Libya	Nonmilitarized episode
312	Algeria	Morocco	Nonmilitarized episode
313	South Africa	Angola	Minor skirmish/border violation
314	Libya	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
314	Egypt	Libya	Alert/exercise
315	Soviet Union	Poland	Alert/exercise
315	Poland	Soviet Union	Nonmilitarized episode
315	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Nonmilitarized episode
315	Poland	East Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
316	Libya	Malta	Nonmilitarized episode
317	Iraq	Iran	Compellent threat
317	Iran	Iraq	War/wartime campaign
318	Libya	Gambia	Nonmilitarized episode
319	Syria	Jordan	Compellent threat
320	Ethiopia	Somalia	Nonmilitarized episode
320	Somalia	Ethiopia	Deterrent warning
320	Somalia	Kenya	Nonmilitarized episode
321	Libya	France	Nonmilitarized episode
321	France	Libya	Alert/exercise
322	Peru	Ecuador	Minor skirmish/border violation
322	Ecuador	Peru	Minor skirmish/border violation
323	South Africa	Mozambique	Compellent threat
324	Iraq	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
324	Israel	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
325	Venezuela	Guyana	Nonmilitarized episode
325	Cuba	Venezuela	Nonmilitarized episode
326	Nicaragua	Honduras	Minor skirmish/border violation

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
326	Honduras	Nicaragua	Minor skirmish/border violation
327	Israel	Syria	Compellent threat
327	Syria	Israel	Minor skirmish/border violation
328	Cameroon	Nigeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
328	Nigeria	Cameroon	Nonmilitarized episode
329	Gambia	Senegal	Nonmilitarized episode
330	United States	Libya	Deterrent warning
331	South Africa	Angola	Alert/exercise
332	Algeria	Morocco	Nonmilitarized episode
333	Soviet Union	Sweden	Deterrent warning
333	Sweden	Soviet Union	Alert/exercise
334	Iran	Bahrain	Nonmilitarized episode
334	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Nonmilitarized episode
335	Iran	Iraq	War/wartime campaign
336	Argentina	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
336	United Kingdom	Argentina	Compellent threat
337	Israel	Lebanon	War/wartime campaign
337	Israel	Syria	War/wartime campaign
337	Syria	Israel	War/wartime campaign
338	Ethiopia	Somalia	Minor skirmish/border violation
338	Somalia	Ethiopia	Minor skirmish/border violation
339	South Africa	Lesotho	Nonmilitarized episode
340	Libya	Sudan	Alert/exercise
340	Libya	Egypt	Alert/exercise
340	United States	Libya	Deterrent warning
341	Nigeria	Chad	Minor skirmish/border violation
341	Chad	Nigeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
342	Libya	Chad	Minor skirmish/border violation
342	Libya	France	Deterrent warning
342	France	Libya	Minor skirmish/border violation
343	Grenada	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
343	United States	Grenada	Minor skirmish/border violation
344	United States	Soviet Union	Alert/exercise
345	Zimbabwe	Botswana	Minor skirmish/border violation
346	Ethiopia	Sudan	Alert/exercise
347	South Africa	Angola	Minor skirmish/border violation
348	Iran	Iraq	War/wartime campaign
348	Iraq	Iran	War/wartime campaign
348	Iran	Kuwait	Nonmilitarized episode
348	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Minor skirmish/border violation
349	Turkey	Greece	Minor skirmish/border violation
350	Libya	Sudan	Nonmilitarized episode
350	Libya	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
350	United States	Libya	Alert/exercise
351	Vietnam	Thailand	Minor skirmish/border violation
352	China	Vietnam	Minor skirmish/border violation
352	Vietnam	China	Minor skirmish/border violation
353	Laos	Thailand	Compellent threat
353	Thailand	Laos	Minor skirmish/border violation
354	Soviet Union	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
354	United States	Nicaragua	Alert/exercise

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
355	South Africa	Botswana	Compellent threat
356	Libya	Tunisia	Compellent threat
357	Israel	Syria	Nonmilitarized episode
357	Syria	Israel	Alert/exercise
358	Libya	Egypt	Nonmilitarized episode
358	Egypt	Libya	Alert/exercise
359	Burkina Faso	Mali	Minor skirmish/border violation
359	Mali	Burkina Faso	Minor skirmish/border violation
360	South Africa	Lesotho	Compellent threat
361	Iran	Iraq	War/wartime campaign
361	Iran	Kuwait	Nonmilitarized episode
361	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Nonmilitarized episode
361	Iraq	Iran	War/wartime campaign
362	Libya	Chad	Minor skirmish/border violation
362	Libya	France	Nonmilitarized episode
362	France	Libya	Nonmilitarized episode
363	United States	Libya	Deterrent warning
363	Libya	United States	Deterrent warning
364	Qatar	Bahrain	Nonmilitarized episode
365	South Africa	Botswana	Nonmilitarized episode
365	South Africa	Zambia	Compellent threat
365	South Africa	Zimbabwe	Compellent threat
366	Sudan	Uganda	Nonmilitarized episode
367	Mozambique	Malawi	Compellent threat
368	Ghana	Togo	Nonmilitarized episode
369	Nicaragua	Honduras	Minor skirmish/border violation
369	Honduras	Nicaragua	Minor skirmish/border violation
370	Libya	Chad	War/wartime campaign
370	Chad	Libya	War/wartime campaign
371	China	Vietnam	War/wartime campaign
371	Vietnam	China	War/wartime campaign
372	Pakistan	India	Alert/exercise
372	India	Pakistan	Alert/exercise
373	Ethiopia	Somalia	Minor skirmish/border violation
374	Iran	Syria	Nonmilitarized episode
375	Algeria	Morocco	Nonmilitarized episode
375	Morocco	Mauritania	Nonmilitarized episode
375	Morocco	Algeria	Nonmilitarized episode
376	Turkey	Greece	Deterrent warning
376	Greece	Turkey	Deterrent warning
377	Cameroon	Nigeria	Nonmilitarized episode
378	Sri Lanka	India	Deterrent warning
378	India	Sri Lanka	Nonmilitarized episode
379	Iran	Saudi Arabia	Nonmilitarized episode
379	Saudi Arabia	Iran	Nonmilitarized episode
380	South Africa	Angola	Minor skirmish/border violation
380	Cuba	South Africa	Minor skirmish/border violation
381	Thailand	Laos	Minor skirmish/border violation
381	Laos	Thailand	Minor skirmish/border violation
382	Uganda	Kenya	Minor skirmish/border violation
382	Kenya	Uganda	Minor skirmish/border violation
383	Nicaragua	Honduras	Minor skirmish/border violation

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
383	United States	Nicaragua	Nonmilitarized episode
384	China	Vietnam	Minor skirmish/border violation
384	Vietnam	China	Minor skirmish/border violation
385	Iraq	Iran	War/wartime campaign
386	Libya	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
386	United States	Libya	Minor skirmish/border violation
387	Mauritania	Senegal	Minor skirmish/border violation
387	Senegal	Mauritania	Minor skirmish/border violation
388	China	Cambodia	Nonmilitarized episode
388	China	Vietnam	Nonmilitarized episode
389	Nicaragua	Honduras	Minor skirmish/border violation
390	Algeria	Morocco	Nonmilitarized episode
391	Panama	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
391	United States	Panama	Compellent threat
392	Pakistan	India	Alert/exercise
392	India	Pakistan	Alert/exercise
393	Iraq	Kuwait	Compellent threat
393	Iraq	United States	War/wartime campaign
393	Iraq	Bahrain	Nonmilitarized episode
393	Iraq	Egypt	War/wartime campaign
393	Iraq	France	War/wartime campaign
393	United States	Iraq	Compellent threat
393	Iraq	Israel	Minor skirmish/border violation
393	Iraq	Oman	Nonmilitarized episode
393	Iraq	Qatar	Nonmilitarized episode
393	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	War/wartime campaign
393	Iraq	Syria	Nonmilitarized episode
393	Iraq	United Arab Emirates	Nonmilitarized episode
393	Iraq	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
394	Uganda	Rwanda	Nonmilitarized episode
395	Burkina Faso	Sierra Leone	Nonmilitarized episode
396	Togo	Ghana	Alert/exercise
397	Croatia	Yugoslavia	Minor skirmish/border violation
397	Yugoslavia	Slovenia	Minor skirmish/border violation
397	Yugoslavia	Croatia	Minor skirmish/border violation
398	Iraq	Kuwait	Alert/exercise
399	Dem. Rep. Congo	Belgium	Nonmilitarized episode
399	Dem. Rep. Congo	France	Nonmilitarized episode
399	France	Dem. Rep. Congo	Nonmilitarized episode
400	Peru	Ecuador	Alert/exercise
400	Ecuador	Peru	Alert/exercise
401	Azerbaijan	Armenia	War/wartime campaign
401	Armenia	Azerbaijan	War/wartime campaign
402	Sudan	Egypt	Minor skirmish/border violation
402	Egypt	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
403	Yugoslavia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	War/wartime campaign
403	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yugoslavia	War/wartime campaign
403	Yugoslavia	Croatia	War/wartime campaign
404	Papua New Guinea	Solomon Islands	Minor skirmish/border violation
404	Solomon Islands	Papua New Guinea	Alert/exercise
405	Myanmar	Thailand	Compellent threat

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
405	Thailand	Myanmar	Minor skirmish/border violation
406	United States, United Kingdom, France	Iraq	Alert/exercise
407	Russia	Georgia	Minor skirmish/border violation
408	United States	North Korea	Nonmilitarized episode
408	North Korea	South Korea	Nonmilitarized episode
408	North Korea	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
409	Syria	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
409	Israel	Lebanon	Minor skirmish/border violation
410	Cameroon	Nigeria	Minor skirmish/border violation
410	Nigeria	Cameroon	Minor skirmish/border violation
411	Haiti	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
411	United States	Haiti	Compellent threat
412	Iraq	Kuwait	Alert/exercise
412	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	Alert/exercise
412	Iraq	United States	Deterrent warning
412	United States	Iraq	Alert/exercise
413	Peru	Ecuador	War/wartime campaign
413	Ecuador	Peru	War/wartime campaign
414	China	Philippines	Alert/exercise
415	Taiwan	China	Deterrent warning
415	China	Taiwan	Nonmilitarized episode
416	Yemen Arab Republic	Eritrea	Nonmilitarized episode
416	Eritrea	Yemen Arab Republic	Nonmilitarized episode
417	Greece	Turkey	Alert/exercise
417	Turkey	Greece	Deterrent warning
418	Nonstate actor	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
418	Israel	Lebanon	Nonmilitarized episode
419	United States	Iraq	Minor skirmish/border violation
419	Iraq	United States	Minor skirmish/border violation
420	North Korea	South Korea	Nonmilitarized episode
420	South Korea	North Korea	Minor skirmish/border violation
421	Rwanda	Dem. Rep. Congo	War/wartime campaign
421	Dem. Rep. Congo	Rwanda	Deterrent warning
422	Iraq	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
422	United States	Iraq	Compellent threat
423	Cyprus	Turkey	Deterrent warning
423	Turkey	Cyprus	Nonmilitarized episode
424	Ethiopia	Eritrea	Compellent threat
424	Eritrea	Ethiopia	War/wartime campaign
425	Pakistan	India	Nonmilitarized episode
425	India	Pakistan	Nonmilitarized episode
426	Dem. Rep. Congo	Rwanda	Compellent threat
426	Rwanda	Angola	War/wartime campaign
426	Rwanda	Chad	War/wartime campaign
426	Rwanda	Dem. Rep. Congo	War/wartime campaign
426	Rwanda	Namibia	War/wartime campaign
426	Rwanda	Zimbabwe	War/wartime campaign
426	Zimbabwe	Uganda	War/wartime campaign
427	United States	Afghanistan	Compellent threat
427	Afghanistan	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
427	United States	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
428	Turkey	Syria	Compellent threat
429	Iraq	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
429	Iraq	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
429	United States	Iraq	Compellent threat
430	Yugoslavia	Albania	Nonmilitarized episode
430	Yugoslavia	Belgium	Nonmilitarized episode
430	Yugoslavia	Canada	Nonmilitarized episode
430	Yugoslavia	France	War/wartime campaign
430	Yugoslavia	Germany	War/wartime campaign
430	Yugoslavia	Italy	War/wartime campaign
430	Yugoslavia	Netherlands	War/wartime campaign
430	Yugoslavia	Portugal	Nonmilitarized episode
430	Yugoslavia	Spain	Nonmilitarized episode
430	Yugoslavia	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
430	Yugoslavia	United States	War/wartime campaign
430	United States	Yugoslavia	Compellent threat
431	Pakistan	India	War/wartime campaign
431	India	Pakistan	War/wartime campaign
432	Indonesia	Australia	Nonmilitarized episode
432	Australia	Indonesia	Nonmilitarized episode
433	Iran	Azerbaijan	Nonmilitarized episode
434	United States	Afghanistan	Compellent threat
434	Afghanistan	Pakistan	Nonmilitarized episode
434	Afghanistan	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
434	Afghanistan	United States	War/wartime campaign
435	Pakistan	India	Alert/exercise
435	India	Pakistan	Compellent threat
436	Pakistan	India	Alert/exercise
436	India	Pakistan	Deterrent warning
437	Myanmar	Thailand	Deterrent warning
437	Thailand	Myanmar	Deterrent warning
438	Morocco	Spain	Alert/exercise
438	Spain	Morocco	Alert/exercise
439	Georgia	Russia	Nonmilitarized episode
439	Russia	Georgia	Nonmilitarized episode
440	United States	Iraq	Compellent threat
440	Iraq	United Kingdom	War/wartime campaign
440	Iraq	United States	War/wartime campaign
441	North Korea	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
441	United States	North Korea	Nonmilitarized episode
442	Iran	France	Nonmilitarized episode
442	Iran	West Germany	Nonmilitarized episode
442	Iran	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
442	United States	Iran	Nonmilitarized episode
443	Syria	Israel	Deterrent warning
443	Israel	Syria	Nonmilitarized episode
444	Rwanda	Dem. Rep. Congo	Minor skirmish/border violation
444	Dem. Rep. Congo	Rwanda	Deterrent warning
445	Russia	Georgia	Deterrent warning
445	Georgia	Russia	Nonmilitarized episode
446	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Minor skirmish/border violation
446	Ethiopia	Eritrea	Minor skirmish/border violation

Table 2. *Continued on next page.*

<i>Crisis No.</i>	<i>Challenger</i>	<i>Defender</i>	<i>Reclassification</i>
447	Sudan	Chad	Nonmilitarized episode
447	Chad	Sudan	Nonmilitarized episode
448	Iran	France	Nonmilitarized episode
448	Iran	United Kingdom	Nonmilitarized episode
448	Iran	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
448	United States	Iran	Nonmilitarized episode
449	Sudan	Chad	Nonmilitarized episode
450	North Korea	United States	Nonmilitarized episode
450	United States	North Korea	Nonmilitarized episode
451	Nonstate actor	Israel	Nonmilitarized episode
451	Israel	Lebanon	Nonmilitarized episode
452	Nonstate actor	Ethiopia	Nonmilitarized episode
453	Sudan	Chad	Minor skirmish/border violation
453	Chad	Sudan	Minor skirmish/border violation
454	Ethiopia	Eritrea	Minor skirmish/border violation
454	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Minor skirmish/border violation
455	Nonstate actor	Chad	Nonmilitarized episode
455	Nonstate actor	Sudan	Nonmilitarized episode

Table 2. *Classification of threats and nonthreats in the ICB archive.*

Appendix B

Replication of Schultz 2001

In “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (2012, 467–70), we attempted to replicate the analysis of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) reciprocation conducted in Kenneth A. Schultz’s book *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (2001) in order to identify the 25 most influential democratic victories in his analysis. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain the original dataset from the study, so instead we re-created the dataset by following the procedures described in the book.⁴ This appendix describes the procedures and results for that replication.⁵ Page references in this appendix refer to Schultz (2001) unless otherwise noted.

Data and Procedures

1. **Dispute data.** Schultz used a dataset of 2,042 MIDs between 1816 and 1992 (125–26). The version of the MID dataset available to him at the time was version 2.1, which we downloaded from the Correlates of War [website](#). It contains 2,034 MIDs from 1816–1992. Due to missing data, Schultz was forced to exclude MIDs occurring after 1984, leaving 1,785 MIDs between 1816 and 1984. Version 2.1 of the MID dataset contains 1,778 MIDs during this period.
2. **Initiators.** We coded dispute initiators using the MID dataset’s SIDEA variable: states for which SIDEA = 1 are coded as initiators. Schultz does not actually specify that he used SIDEA to code initiators, but it is standard practice to do so.
3. **Reciprocation.** The dependent variable, MID reciprocation, was coded 1 if the target of the MID achieved a hostility level (HOSTLEV) of 2 or greater (263). This information is also provided by the MID dataset’s RECIP variable.
4. **Originators.** Schultz required that initiators and targets be original participants in the dispute, excluding late-joiners from the analysis (262–63). Information about MID

⁴Schultz described these procedures in scrupulous detail on pages 125–31, 141–44, and 261–72.

⁵The file `Appendix B.do`, available at <http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/tsechser>, performs the operations described in this appendix.

originators and joiners is provided by the `ORIGINATE` variable; we exclude participants for which `ORIGINATE = 0` in the dataset.

5. **Regime type data.** Schultz employed the Polity III dataset, which covers the years 1800–1994 (129). Although the Polity dataset has been updated since the publication of Schultz’s book, we obtained the original Polity III dataset from the ICPSR [website](#) to ensure that we replicated the original study as closely as possible.
6. **Democracy.** Schultz coded democracies as states that had a competitively-elected executive as well as a stable, enduring system of political competition (128–30). The Polity III dataset provides this information with the `XRCOMP` and `PARREG` variables. Democracies are coded 1 if `XRCOMP = 2` or `3` and `PARREG = 2` or `5`.
7. **Major powers.** Schultz coded major powers in the system as follows (264): United States: 1899–1993; Great Britain: 1816–1993; France: 1816–1940 and 1945–93; Prussia/Germany: 1816–1918, 1925–45, and 1990–93; Austria-Hungary: 1816–1918; Italy: 1860–1943; Russia/Soviet Union: 1816–1917 and 1922–93; China: 1950–93; Japan: 1895–1945; 1990–93.
8. **Military capabilities data.** Schultz derived military capabilities data from the National Material Capabilities dataset (264). The dataset used in the book is version 2.1, which covers the years 1816–1993. We were able to download this version of the dataset from the Correlates of War [website](#).
9. **Participants’ military capabilities.** In Schultz’s analysis, each dispute participants’ military capabilities were calculated using the standard Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (`CINC`) score (264–65). This variable contains information about individual states’ annual share of global capabilities across six dimensions: military personnel, military expenditures, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population. The `CINC` score is calculated by computing a state’s proportion of capabilities in each of the six categories, and then averaging the six proportions. We computed `CINC` scores this way using data from the National Material Capabilities dataset.
10. **Contiguity.** Schultz coded disputants as contiguous if they either shared a land border or were separated by 150 miles of water or less (265). He derived this information from the Direct Contiguity dataset, available from the Correlates of War [website](#).⁶

⁶Schultz does not indicate which version of the Direct Contiguity dataset he used; we therefore used the only version available on the website, which was version 3.1.

11. **Alliance portfolio similarity.** To control for the similarity of disputants’ alliance portfolios, Schultz utilized “*S*-scores,” weighted to account for each ally’s military capabilities (265–66). Schultz’s original source for these data was a [website](#) that unfortunately is no longer available, so we calculated these scores using EUGene software (v. 3.204).
12. **Status quo evaluation.** The measure for status quo satisfaction used in Schultz’s study is the τ_b score, which indicates the similarity of a given state’s alliance portfolio to that of the most powerful state in the system (266). Schultz does not specify where he obtained these data, but we were able to generate τ_b scores using the EUGene program.
13. **Issue type.** Schultz included dummy variables to indicate whether the central issue in a dispute was about territory, government/regime type, policy, or something else. These data were drawn from the MID dataset’s variable for type of revision (REV TYPE). Using this variable, we created the same four variables used in Schultz’s analysis.
14. **Multilateral disputes.** We replicated Schultz’s fourth model of MID reciprocation, which excludes multilateral MIDs (146–47). We therefore excluded MIDs containing more than one participant on either side.
15. **World war years.** Model 4 excludes the years 1914–18 and 1939–45; thus, our replication also excludes MIDs initiated during these years.

Results

The results from our replication of Schultz’s Model 4 are reported in Table 3. The first column displays Schultz’s original results; the second column reports the equivalent results from our attempt to replicate Schultz’s model by following his procedures verbatim. These results are very near to those originally reported by Schultz. This “verbatim replication” is the regression used to generate the list of the 25 most influential democratic victories reported in Downes and Sechser (2012, 469).

Although we followed the procedures in *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* as closely as possible, we acknowledge that the replication results in column 2 do not perfectly match Schultz’s original results. Since we do not have access to the original dataset, it is impossible to ascertain the reason for this disparity. However, we discovered that a minor modification to the original procedures yielded results which, in our view, are substantially closer to the original – particularly with respect to the critical DEMOCRATIC INITIATOR variable. This modification involves the two measures of alliance portfolio similarity used in the regressions:

	<i>Schultz 2001, Original Model 4 (pp. 146-47)</i>	<i>Downes and Sechser 2012 Verbatim Replication</i>	<i>Downes and Sechser 2012 Modified Replication</i>
DEMOCRATIC INITIATOR	-0.53** (0.19)	-0.37* (0.19)	-0.47* (0.19)
DEMOCRATIC TARGET	0.0019 (0.17)	-0.05 (0.17)	0.0049 (0.17)
BOTH DEMOCRATIC	0.41 (0.36)	0.49 (0.36)	0.50 (0.36)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-0.52* (0.25)	-0.31 (0.31)	-0.51* (0.25)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MINOR POWER TARGET	-0.40* (0.19)	-0.24 (0.21)	-0.36† (0.19)
MINOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	0.05 (0.24)	0.23 (0.26)	0.17 (0.25)
INITIATOR'S SHARE OF CAPABILITIES	0.04 (0.25)	0.06 (0.25)	0.11 (0.25)
CONTIGUOUS	0.55** (0.16)	0.55** (0.15)	0.59** (0.16)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY	-0.05 (0.24)	0.17 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.20)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF INITIATOR	0.54† (0.29)	-0.08 (0.20)	0.18 (0.19)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF TARGET	-0.72** (0.26)	-0.26 (0.23)	-0.48* (0.19)
TERRITORY	0.29† (0.17)	0.27 (0.17)	0.30† (0.17)
GOVERNMENT	0.35 (0.36)	0.24 (0.38)	0.31 (0.39)
POLICY	-1.27** (0.16)	-1.21** (0.16)	-1.20** (0.16)
OTHER	-0.51 (0.65)	-0.61 (0.59)	-0.49 (0.59)
CONSTANT	0.43 (0.34)	0.08 (0.28)	0.21 (0.24)
χ^2	172.93**	183.11**	188.17**
<i>Correctly Predicted</i>	68.0%	67.0%	67.4%
<i>Modal Outcome</i>	50.8%	50.7%	50.7%
<i>N</i>	1,184	1,153	1,153

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. The “modified” replication uses τ_b scores (rather than weighted S -scores) for ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY and weighted S -scores (rather than τ_b scores) for the STATUS QUO EVALUATION variables.

Table 3. *Attempted replication of Schultz’s (2001) analysis of MID reciprocation.*

τ_b scores and weighted S -scores. In the original regression, the τ_b method was used to calculate dyadic portfolio similarity, while the S -score method was used to measure similarity with the system leader. We simply switched these two measures, substituting τ_b scores for weighted S -scores in the variable ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY and substituting weighted S -scores for τ_b scores in the STATUS QUO EVALUATION variables. This change yields the results in the third column, which more closely match Schultz’s original Model 4.

Our list of the 25 most influential democratic victories (Downes and Sechser 2012, 469) was derived from the “verbatim replication” regression. However, the “modified regression,” while slightly inconsistent with the procedures described by Schultz (2001), appears to match his original results more closely. It is therefore important to ask whether our list of 25 cases changes significantly when the “modified” regression is used to generate DFBETAS.

We find that it does not. Table 4 lists the 25 most influential democratic victories from the verbatim replication, in descending order of influence. The second column from the right reports each case’s ranking in the “modified” replication. The table demonstrates that there is very little change from one regression to the next: 22 of the top 25 democratic victories in the first regression remain in the top 25 in the second regression, and all cases remain in the top 30. Individual rankings change by an average of just 3.4 spots between the two regressions, and three cases (including the most influential case) do not move at all.

The reason for including the list of Schultz’s 25 most influential democratic victories in our article was to demonstrate that the most important democratic victories in the MID dataset are not actually appropriate for evaluating democratic credibility theory: these cases do not contain coercive threats, and thus tell us little about the credibility of threats. This exercise demonstrates that our argument remains valid even if we modify Schultz’s procedures so that the regression results more closely match his original regressions.

<i>Dispute No.</i>	<i>Initiator</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>DFBETA</i> ($\times 10^{-2}$)	<i>Ranking:</i> <i>Verbatim</i>	<i>Ranking:</i> <i>Modified</i>	<i>Rank</i> <i>Change</i>
1335	Botswana	Rhodesia	1969	-2.342	1	1	0
1739	Greece	Ottoman Empire	1888	-2.265	2	5	-3
2089	India	China	1954	-2.158	3	4	-1
2101	India	China	1979	-2.026	4	3	+1
1100	Chile	Argentina	1959	-1.922	5	2	+3
2116	United States	Mexico	1842	-1.901	6	8	-2
1462	India	Nepal	1968	-1.859	7	7	0
3421	Israel	Egypt	1959	-1.831	8	9	-1
3420	Israel	Egypt	1958	-1.813	9	11	-2
3376	Israel	Egypt	1962	-1.799	10	12	-2
3382	Israel	Egypt	1977	-1.734	11	16	-5
3383	Israel	Egypt	1979	-1.722	12	17	-5
2087	Argentina	Chile	1984	-1.689	13	6	+7
3414	Israel	Syria	1952	-1.685	14	20	-6
3416	Israel	Syria	1955	-1.676	15	22	-7
2841	Burma	Thailand	1959	-1.675	16	21	-5
3117	Malaysia	Philippines	1980	-1.662	17	24	-7
2100	India	China	1973	-1.636	18	15	+3
2099	India	China	1971	-1.629	19	14	+5
2878	Austria	Hungary	1960	-1.525	20	19	+1
1555	United States	Mexico	1836	-1.523	21	29	-8
2042	Costa Rica	Nicaragua	1957	-1.496	22	18	+4
1309	India	Pakistan	1961	-1.487	23	27	-4
3187	Greece	Bulgaria	1928	-1.483	24	28	-4
1548	United States	Mexico	1859	-1.470	25	25	0

Table 4. *The 25 most influential democratic victories in the “verbatim” replication of Schultz’s (2001) analysis.*

Appendix C

Procedures and Results Using the MCT Dataset

One of the central objectives of “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (2012, 474-83) was to reevaluate democratic credibility theory using a dataset comprised of only coercive threats. This was critical because, as the first part of the article demonstrated, the MID and ICB datasets contain a high proportion of superfluous events and therefore cannot yield reliable inferences about democratic threats. To conduct a more reliable test, we need a dataset in which the unit of analysis is the coercive threat.

We therefore employed the Militarized Compellent Threats (MCT) dataset (Sechser 2011) for our tests. This dataset, which was constructed explicitly for the purpose of evaluating hypotheses about the effectiveness of threats, contains 210 episodes in which a challenger demanded that a target revise the status quo and threatened to use military force if it did not comply. To ensure the most favorable conditions for democratic credibility theory, our tests emulated the research designs of Schultz (2001) and Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001). In this appendix, we describe our procedures in more detail; present full regression results from the central tests; and present results from several robustness checks that were mentioned in the article.⁷

Emulation of Schultz 2001

We first emulated the empirical approach used by Schultz in *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, employing binary logistic regressions to estimate the probability that a compellent threat, once issued, will fail. Schultz included 15 independent variables in his regressions; we created the same 15 variables in our dataset using the same coding procedures and data.⁸ Where possible, we used updated versions of the datasets Schultz employed. Specifically, we used version IV of the Polity dataset; version 3.02 of the National Material Capabilities

⁷The file `Appendix C.do`, available at <http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/tsechser>, performs the operations described in this appendix.

⁸In two regressions, Schultz also included a dummy variable for each of the world war years. We duplicated these variables as well.

dataset; and version 3.1 of the Direct Contiguity dataset. We generated alliance portfolio data from version 3.204 of the EUGene program.⁹

In Schultz’s regressions, factors that were associated with unreciprocated disputes – that is, successful challenges – took on a negative coefficient. For ease of comparison with Schultz’s results, we coded failed compellent threats as 1 and 0 otherwise, so that factors associated with successful threats also would take on a negative coefficient.

Broadly, we considered a threat successful if (1) the target complied with the challenger’s demands and (2) the challenger did not have to use significant military force to achieve this compliance.¹⁰ In operational terms, we defined successful threats as those that achieved full compliance with all of the challenger’s demands, with 100 or fewer military fatalities on the target’s side. This standard acknowledges that challengers sometimes use limited amounts of force to communicate their resolve, while still distinguishing demonstrative uses of force from outright physical compulsion.

We also employed several different dichotomous indicators of democracy to ensure that our findings were not dependent on any one measure. First, we used Schultz’s own definition, which relied on data from the Polity dataset.¹¹ Second, we used the standard Polity definition of democracy (Jagers and Gurr 1995), which defines democracies as states with POLITY scores of +6 or higher (on a scale from –10 to +10). Finally, we used democracy indicators developed by three different teams of scholars: Cheibub et al. (2010); Przeworski et al. (2000), and Boix and Rosato (2001). In all, we used five different measures of democracy.

The regression tables below report the findings from these tests.

⁹See Appendix B for more details about coding procedures.

¹⁰As we argued in “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (see especially pages 464–67), the MID and ICB datasets conflate military compulsion with successful coercive diplomacy. To avoid this problem in our analysis, it is important that threats be considered unsuccessful if the challenger resorts to significant military force to achieve its objectives.

¹¹Schultz (2001) defined democracies as states with a competitively elected executive and a stable, enduring system of political competition. Using variables from the Polity dataset, this translates to $XRCOMP \geq 2$ and $PARREG = 2$ or 5 . Schultz (2001, 127–30) argued that this definition most closely fits with the logic of democratic credibility theory.

Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities

Democracy measure: Schultz 2001

	<i>All Crises</i>		<i>Bilateral Crises Only</i>	
	<i>1</i> World Wars Included	<i>2</i> World Wars Excluded	<i>3</i> World Wars Included	<i>4</i> World Wars Excluded
DEMOCRATIC INITIATOR	0.31 (0.55)	0.22 (0.56)	0.40 (0.63)	0.32 (0.64)
DEMOCRATIC TARGET	0.33 (0.52)	0.44 (0.58)	0.43 (0.66)	0.21 (0.72)
BOTH DEMOCRATIC	-0.47 (0.82)	-0.53 (0.87)	-1.32 (1.09)	-1.09 (1.14)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-0.27 (0.86)	-0.91 (1.00)	-0.79 (0.88)	-1.28 (0.99)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MINOR POWER TARGET	0.84 (0.55)	0.79 (0.63)	0.72 (0.56)	0.45 (0.59)
MINOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-2.34* (1.10)	-1.91† (1.12)	-2.19* (1.01)	-1.87† (1.03)
INITIATOR'S SHARE OF CAPABILITIES	0.10 (0.68)	0.20 (0.77)	0.33 (0.74)	0.14 (0.82)
CONTIGUOUS	-0.36 (0.45)	-0.16 (0.48)	0.07 (0.54)	0.05 (0.58)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY	0.55 (0.72)	0.61 (0.81)	0.26 (0.79)	0.28 (0.88)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF INITIATOR	-0.31 (0.55)	0.05 (0.63)	-0.61 (0.68)	0.07 (0.75)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF TARGET	-1.07 (0.67)	-2.10* (0.91)	-0.39 (0.72)	-1.82* (0.89)
TERRITORY	0.14 (0.43)	0.06 (0.49)	-0.16 (0.49)	-0.07 (0.54)
GOVERNMENT	-2.19** (0.72)	-2.61** (0.81)	-2.48** (0.77)	-2.05* (0.80)
POLICY	0.05 (0.39)	-0.07 (0.46)	-0.03 (0.42)	-0.32 (0.48)
OTHER	0.12 (0.43)	0.35 (0.53)	-0.11 (0.46)	0.05 (0.51)
CONSTANT	0.30 (0.94)	0.15 (1.01)	0.40 (1.09)	0.66 (1.25)
<i>N</i>	230	198	177	149

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 employ robust standard errors clustered on crisis. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Dummy variables for world war years are included in Models 1 and 3 but not reported here.

Table 5. *Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the MCT dataset.*

Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities

Democracy measure: Polity

	<i>All Crises</i>		<i>Bilateral Crises Only</i>	
	⁵ <i>World Wars Included</i>	⁶ <i>World Wars Excluded</i>	⁷ <i>World Wars Included</i>	⁸ <i>World Wars Excluded</i>
DEMOCRATIC INITIATOR	-0.00 (0.51)	-0.19 (0.51)	0.22 (0.63)	0.03 (0.63)
DEMOCRATIC TARGET	-0.75 (0.49)	-0.76 (0.56)	-0.80 (0.55)	-1.02 (0.62)
BOTH DEMOCRATIC	0.62 (0.84)	0.70 (0.89)	-0.76 (1.14)	-0.52 (1.19)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-0.39 (0.87)	-1.14 (0.97)	-0.96 (0.91)	-1.60 (1.01)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MINOR POWER TARGET	0.71 (0.54)	0.66 (0.60)	0.49 (0.57)	0.25 (0.60)
MINOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-2.51* (1.11)	-2.00† (1.13)	-2.28* (1.02)	-1.90† (1.04)
INITIATOR'S SHARE OF CAPABILITIES	0.10 (0.68)	0.23 (0.77)	0.42 (0.74)	0.37 (0.83)
CONTIGUOUS	-0.52 (0.45)	-0.22 (0.49)	-0.12 (0.55)	0.01 (0.60)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY	0.41 (0.73)	0.35 (0.81)	0.05 (0.80)	-0.07 (0.90)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF INITIATOR	-0.35 (0.55)	0.10 (0.62)	-0.74 (0.67)	0.05 (0.75)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF TARGET	-0.75 (0.67)	-1.77* (0.88)	0.07 (0.74)	-1.42 (0.90)
TERRITORY	0.22 (0.44)	0.11 (0.50)	0.01 (0.51)	0.10 (0.56)
GOVERNMENT	-2.29** (0.71)	-2.76** (0.81)	-2.48** (0.77)	-2.10** (0.81)
POLICY	0.12 (0.40)	-0.06 (0.47)	0.09 (0.43)	-0.26 (0.49)
OTHER	0.05 (0.44)	0.21 (0.55)	-0.14 (0.46)	-0.05 (0.52)
CONSTANT	0.76 (0.93)	0.70 (1.01)	0.80 (1.11)	1.02 (1.25)
<i>N</i>	230	198	177	149

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 5 and 6 employ robust standard errors clustered on crisis. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Dummy variables for world war years are included in Models 5 and 7 but not reported here.

Table 6. *Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the MCT dataset.*

Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities

Democracy measure: Cheibub et al. 2010¹²

	<i>9</i> <i>All Crises</i>	<i>10</i> <i>Bilateral Crises Only</i>
DEMOCRATIC INITIATOR	0.27 (0.70)	0.51 (0.99)
DEMOCRATIC TARGET	0.16 (0.85)	-0.11 (0.97)
BOTH DEMOCRATIC	-1.08 (1.46)	-1.16 (1.53)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-0.43 (1.18)	0.00 (1.50)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MINOR POWER TARGET	1.19 (1.10)	1.94 [†] (1.16)
MINOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-0.14 (1.03)	0.40 (2.19)
INITIATOR'S SHARE OF CAPABILITIES	2.21 [†] (1.16)	3.11* (1.48)
CONTIGUOUS	0.23 (0.59)	0.43 (0.96)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY	2.20 [†] (1.20)	2.90 [†] (1.51)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF INITIATOR	0.07 (0.93)	0.06 (1.15)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF TARGET	-2.43* (1.00)	-2.59 [†] (1.33)
TERRITORY	-0.08 (0.77)	-0.68 (0.87)
GOVERNMENT	-2.93 [†] (1.64)	-4.35** (1.41)
POLICY	-0.61 (1.08)	-1.96* (0.93)
OTHER	0.27 (1.01)	-0.63 (0.98)
CONSTANT	-1.99 (1.60)	-2.25 (1.93)
<i>N</i>	117	93

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Model 9 employs robust standard errors clustered on crisis. [†] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7. *Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the MCT dataset.*

¹²Note that data from Cheibub et al. (2010) extend from 1946–2001, thus obviating the need for differential treatment of the world war years.

Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities

Democracy measure: Przeworski et al. 2000¹³

	¹¹ <i>All Crises</i>	¹² <i>Bilateral Crises Only</i>
DEMOCRATIC INITIATOR	0.32 (0.73)	0.58 (1.01)
DEMOCRATIC TARGET	0.26 (0.87)	0.03 (0.99)
BOTH DEMOCRATIC	-1.48 (1.37)	-1.75 (1.56)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-0.39 (1.20)	0.05 (1.53)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MINOR POWER TARGET	1.30 (1.12)	2.05 [†] (1.20)
MINOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	0.28 (1.01)	1.02 (2.60)
INITIATOR'S SHARE OF CAPABILITIES	2.62* (1.21)	3.78* (1.60)
CONTIGUOUS	0.57 (0.62)	0.96 (1.04)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY	2.20 [†] (1.22)	2.92 [†] (1.53)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF INITIATOR	0.05 (0.93)	0.01 (1.17)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF TARGET	-2.26* (1.02)	-2.33 [†] (1.37)
TERRITORY	-0.11 (0.79)	-0.89 (0.89)
GOVERNMENT	-2.80 [†] (1.62)	-4.29** (1.44)
POLICY	-0.63 (1.12)	-2.17* (0.98)
OTHER	0.26 (1.07)	-0.72 (1.00)
CONSTANT	-2.55 (1.68)	-2.96 (2.06)
<i>N</i>	115	91

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Model 11 employs robust standard errors clustered on crisis. [†] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8. *Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the MCT dataset.*

¹³Note that updated data from Przeworski et al. (2000) extend from 1946–2001, thus obviating the need for differential treatment of the world war years.

Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities

Democracy measure: Boix and Rosato 2001

	<i>All Crises</i>		<i>Bilateral Crises Only</i>	
	¹³ <i>World Wars Included</i>	¹⁴ <i>World Wars Excluded</i>	¹⁵ <i>World Wars Included</i>	¹⁶ <i>World Wars Excluded</i>
DEMOCRATIC INITIATOR	-0.36 (0.56)	-0.67 (0.55)	-0.31 (0.65)	-0.69 (0.67)
DEMOCRATIC TARGET	-1.32* (0.59)	-1.50* (0.70)	-1.15* (0.56)	-1.78** (0.68)
BOTH DEMOCRATIC	1.29 (0.95)	1.45 (1.02)	-0.31 (1.15)	0.37 (1.22)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-0.61 (0.96)	-1.60 (1.05)	-1.00 (0.95)	-1.89† (1.09)
MAJOR POWER INITIATOR— MINOR POWER TARGET	0.87 (0.57)	0.83 (0.63)	0.60 (0.59)	0.36 (0.62)
MINOR POWER INITIATOR— MAJOR POWER TARGET	-2.34* (1.16)	-1.66 (1.20)	-1.96† (1.03)	-1.54 (1.11)
INITIATOR'S SHARE OF CAPABILITIES	-0.20 (0.75)	-0.09 (0.90)	0.17 (0.78)	0.02 (0.90)
CONTIGUOUS	-0.68 (0.50)	-0.34 (0.58)	-0.20 (0.59)	-0.11 (0.68)
ALLIANCE PORTFOLIO SIMILARITY	-0.08 (0.84)	-0.33 (0.96)	-0.17 (0.86)	-0.36 (0.99)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF INITIATOR	-0.13 (0.67)	0.62 (0.83)	-0.21 (0.68)	0.91 (0.83)
STATUS QUO EVALUATION OF TARGET	-0.86 (0.73)	-2.20* (0.99)	-0.07 (0.77)	-1.89† (1.00)
TERRITORY	0.12 (0.47)	-0.05 (0.56)	-0.09 (0.53)	0.08 (0.60)
GOVERNMENT	-2.43** (0.71)	-2.89** (0.88)	-2.71** (0.79)	-2.45** (0.83)
POLICY	-0.16 (0.44)	-0.46 (0.52)	0.07 (0.44)	-0.36 (0.52)
OTHER	-0.33 (0.47)	-0.32 (0.58)	-0.50 (0.49)	-0.57 (0.56)
CONSTANT	1.71 (1.10)	1.96 (1.22)	1.33 (1.21)	1.90 (1.44)
<i>N</i>	197	165	161	133

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 13 and 10 employ robust standard errors clustered on crisis. † $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Dummy variables for world war years are included in Models 13 and 11 but not reported here.

Table 9. *Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the MCT dataset.*

Emulation of Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001

We next emulated the empirical approach used by Gelpi and Griesdorf in their 2001 article in the *American Political Science Review*. As with our emulation of Schultz (2001), we adopted the same coding procedures and methods (where possible) to ensure the most favorable testing conditions for democratic credibility theory.

Data and Procedures

1. **Threat success.** Gelpi and Griesdorf coded crisis outcomes trichotomously, indicating whether a crisis represented a win, draw, or loss for a challenger. The MCT dataset does not explicitly code wins, draws, and losses, but its trichotomous COMPLIANCE measure maps quite nicely onto this coding scheme. We coded threats that achieved full compliance with fewer than 100 fatalities as “wins” (SUCCESS = 2), threats that achieved partial compliance with fewer than 100 fatalities as “draws” (SUCCESS = 1), and threats that either achieved no compliance or escalated beyond 100 fatalities as “losses” (SUCCESS = 0).
2. **Democracy.** Gelpi and Griesdorf used POLITY scores to create the variables CHALLENGER’S DEMOCRACY and DEFENDER’S DEMOCRACY, both of which range from 1 to 21. We obtained this data from version IV of the Polity dataset. To check the robustness of our findings, we repeated our regressions using democracy scores developed by Vanhanen (2000) and Pemstein et al. (2010). Like the 21-point POLITY scores, these measures are continuous.¹⁴ The variable JOINT DEMOCRACY was calculated by simply interacting these two terms, and RELATIVE AUDIENCE COSTS was computed by subtracting the defender’s democracy score from the challenger’s score and squaring the difference, following Gelpi and Griesdorf’s procedure (2001, 638).
3. **Military capabilities.** To create the variable RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES, Gelpi and Griesdorf used the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) score for each participant in the crisis: $RELATIVE\ MILITARY\ CAPABILITIES = \frac{CINCA}{CINCA + CINCB}$. We computed CINC scores this way using data from version 3.02 of the National Material Capabilities dataset, available from the Correlates of War [website](#).
4. **Nuclear weapons possession.** Gelpi and Griesdorf coded nuclear possession beginning in the year of a state’s first publicly acknowledged nuclear tests. These start dates are as follows: United States: 1945; United Kingdom: 1952; France: 1960; China: 1964; India: 1974. They also coded Israel as a nuclear state beginning in 1969, and

¹⁴To allow for easier comparison, the democracy scores from Vanhanen (2000) and Pemstein et al. (2010) were rescaled to match the range of the Polity dataset (i.e., 1–21).

identified Pakistan as a publicly acknowledged nuclear state beginning in 1992.¹⁵ We adopted the same rules.

5. **Alliances.** Following Gelpi and Griesdorf’s procedure, we coded the variable SHARED ALLIANCE TIES by referring to the Formal Interstate Alliance dataset (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). We used version 3.03 of the dataset, available at the [Correlates of War website](#). This variable was coded 1 if the challenger and defender shared an alliance at the time of the crisis, and 0 otherwise.
6. **Resolve.** Gelpi and Griesdorf sought to include a measure of each state’s relative reliance on violence in their bargaining strategy. Their goal was to test whether democracies have an advantage in crises when they publicly demonstrate resolve. The ICB dataset, which Gelpi and Griesdorf relied on for their study, codes each state’s crisis management strategy on an eight-point scale, where higher values represent increasing levels of violence. Gelpi and Griesdorf collapsed this down to a four-point scale, then subtracted the defender’s score from the challenger’s score to obtain the variable RELATIVE RESOLVE. While the MCT dataset does not have a variable explicitly measuring states’ reliance on violence, it does indicate whether challengers engaged in demonstrations or actual uses of military force against targets. We therefore coded RELATIVE RESOLVE as 2 if the challenger used military force against the target, 1 if it employed military maneuvers or demonstrations of force during the crisis, and 0 if it used neither. The procedure is slightly different, but the principle is the same: to identify public signals of resolve that might engage domestic audiences and enhance the credibility of democratic threats.
7. **Interests.** Gelpi and Griesdorf included a variable intended to measure the relative importance of the crisis stakes to each participant. This variable, RELATIVE INTERESTS AT STAKE, was derived directly from ICB’s six-point measurement of interests. Unfortunately, the MCT dataset does not contain an equivalent measurement of interests, so we could not include this variable. However, this variable was not central to Gelpi and Griesdorf’s test of democratic credibility theory.

Results

As discussed in our article (pages 479–83), Gelpi and Griesdorf used ordered probit regressions; we did so as well. We present three regressions below – one for each of the three measures of democracy that we employed.

¹⁵Gelpi and Griesdorf do not code South Africa as a nuclear state. They explain this decision on page 639, footnote 19.


	<i>17</i> <i>Polity</i>	<i>18</i> <i>Vanhanen 2000</i>	<i>19</i> <i>Pemstein et al. 2010</i>
CHALLENGER'S DEMOCRACY	-0.0148 (0.0567)	-0.0527 (0.0577)	-0.2445 (0.2206)
DEFENDER'S DEMOCRACY	0.0117 (0.0573)	-0.0252 (0.0568)	-0.2861 [†] (0.2123)
JOINT DEMOCRACY	0.0022 (0.0052)	0.0098 [†] (0.0067)	0.0367 [†] (0.0241)
RELATIVE AUDIENCE COSTS	0.0009 (0.0030)	0.0074* (0.0039)	0.0187 [†] (0.0125)
RELATIVE AUDIENCE COSTS × RELATIVE RESOLVE	-0.0006 (0.0012)	-0.0031* (0.0017)	-0.0055 (0.0053)
RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES × JOINT DEMOCRACY	-0.0020 (0.0025)	-0.0050 [†] (0.0038)	-0.0074 (0.0117)
RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES	-0.0268 (0.4520)	-0.2168 (0.3944)	0.0786 (1.2155)
RELATIVE RESOLVE	-0.3101* (0.1700)	-0.1465 (0.1698)	-0.1451 (0.2267)
DISPUTANTS SHARE ALLIANCE TIE	0.0491 (0.5344)	-0.1819 (0.5595)	0.1875 (0.8668)
RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES × DISPUTANTS SHARE ALLIANCE TIE	-0.0938 (0.6971)	0.2437 (0.7429)	-0.1037 (1.1754)
CHALLENGER NUCLEAR WEAPONS	-0.2568 (0.3552)	-0.3428 (0.3149)	-0.4194 (0.4643)
DEFENDER NUCLEAR WEAPONS	0.7994* (0.4448)	0.7452 [†] (0.4967)	1.0524* (0.5526)
<i>First Threshold</i>	-0.2317	-0.1015	-1.5783
<i>Second Threshold</i>	-0.0924	0.0469	-1.4321
<i>N</i>	242	221	112

NOTE: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, clustered on crisis. [†] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, one-tailed tests. The regression results reported on page 480 of “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” are contained in Model 17.


Table 10. *Ordered probit analyses of compellent threat success using the MCT dataset.*

Table 10 reports the results of these regressions. Because of the interaction terms, however, it is difficult to assess the net effect of democracy by examining the coefficients and standard errors. Figure 1 therefore plots the predicted probability of compellent threat success as the challenger becomes more democratic. The charts assume favorable conditions for democratic challengers – namely, resolved challengers and highly autocratic targets.¹⁶ For comparison, chart (a) plots Gelpi and Griesdorf’s original results. The results indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that a challenger’s level of democracy is *unrelated* to the probability that a compellent threat will succeed, other things being equal. This is true no matter which measure of democracy we use.


¹⁶All of these charts were generated using *Clarify* (King et al. 2000). These estimates hold other variables constant at the following values: DEFENDER’S DEMOCRACY 1; JOINT DEMOCRACY 0; RELATIVE RESOLVE 2 (maximum); DISPUTANTS SHARE ALLIANCE TIE 0; CHALLENGER NUCLEAR WEAPONS 0; DEFENDER NUCLEAR WEAPONS 0. RELATIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES was held at the in-sample mean, and thus varied from sample to sample.




(a) *Gelpi and Griesdorf's (2001) original results using the International Crisis Behavior dataset.*



(b) *Reassessed results using the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset (Model 17).*



(c) *Reassessed results using the MCT dataset and Vanhanen's (2000) democracy scores (Model 18).*



(d) *Reassessed results using the MCT dataset and Pemstein et al.'s (2010) democracy scores (Model 19).*

Figure 1. *Predicted probabilities of compellent threat success.*

References

- Boix, Carles and Sebastian Rosato. 2001. "A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-1999." Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago.
- Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/>.
- Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143(1-2): 67–101.
- Correlates of War 2 Project. 2004. "Dispute Narratives – MID 3.0 Dataset." Unpublished manuscript, Pennsylvania State University. Available at <http://cow2.la.psu.edu>.
- Downes, Alexander B. and Todd S. Sechser. 2012. "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility." *International Organization* 66(3): 457–89.
- Gelpi, Christopher and Michael Griesdorf. 2001. "Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94." *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 633–47.
- Gibler, Douglas M. and Meredith Reid Sarkees. 2004. "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816-2000." *Journal of Peace Research* 41(2): 211–22.
- Jagers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 32(4): 469–482.
- King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 347–361.
- Pemstein, Daniel, Stephen A. Meserve, and James Melton. 2010. "Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type." *Political Analysis* 18(4): 426–49.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sechser, Todd S. 2011. "Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(4): 377–401.
- Vanhanen, Tatu. 2000. "A New Dataset for Measuring Democracy, 1810-1998." *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2): 251–65.